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27 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Allied Military Planning on Berlin (U)

Attached are draft papers which we intend to coordinate with the Department of State, with a view to presenting them for consideration at the forthcoming Paris meeting of Foreign Ministers.

These drafts set forth a United States position on the tripartite military planning effort required, and contain draft instructions to military authorities of the three nations reorienting Live Oak planning to conform with our proposals concerning military actions related to a Berlin crisis.

In view of the short time available prior to the start of working group discussions, I request that you provide any comments which the Joint Chiefs of Staff may wish to make no later than 29 July 1961.

1 Enclosure

Draft paper on Military
Planning and Preparations
Toward a Berlin Crisis,
w/1 Encl.

S/ Robert S. McNamara

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SECRET, 5(D), 5(E)

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E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

CSO (Ltr (WAK-77-407)

BY MFM

NARS, DATE 11/16/77

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
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Military Planning and Preparations
Toward a Berlin Crisis

As with other elements of our Berlin programs, military activities should all aim, first, to forestall a Berlin crisis and, second, to advance Allied interests if a crisis does occur. Both are political purposes.

Military activities relating to Berlin can be grouped geographically. Some are carried on by each Ally on its own national territory, and each should keep the others suitably informed through Berlin planning channels of its military developments and intentions. Some military measures can also be taken under national control outside of national territory and outside of Central Europe. These measures should be closely coordinated with non-military measures and with the actions of other Allies.



The [redacted] group has made a most productive contribution as a planning staff. The concept of a separate inter-Allied military group has proved useful, and the appointment of the SACEUR as its responsible head has proved of special benefit.



The US firmly supports such a shift and hopes its major allies will also find this step militarily desirable.

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- 2 -

The question arises of how to arrange military command and political control if a Berlin situation progresses from clearly tripartite activity concerning access rights into larger scale military activity involving the NATO Alliance as a whole. The attached proposed directive describes some military courses of action for which this question would be of high importance. In an operation to restore ground access,

[REDACTED] the North Atlantic Treaty comes into operation and the military problem becomes one which should be handled through established NATO mechanisms. To assure continuity of military control and uninterrupted consistency of political purpose during a transition from [REDACTED] to SACEUR control is an urgent politico-military problem. The US considers that this question should be examined by the [REDACTED] group in the light of certain political principles laid out by the foreign Ministers. The US also considers that recommendations should be made by General Norstad, in his [REDACTED] capacity, to the tripartite national military authorities with a view to governmental decision on the procedure for transition from [REDACTED] control to SACEUR control.

The degree of association of the FRG with [REDACTED] requires examination. There is no doubt that the special status of the US, UK, and France as occupation powers in Berlin entitles and obliges certain actions by them in concert; these may extend to tripartite military actions of the

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- 3 -

sorts already planned, and more extensive actions as well. But the FRG can make valuable contributions to the planning as well as to those stages of execution of military plans following after forcible Soviet/GDR opposition. It is therefore the US view that while retaining the essentially tripartite character of the [REDACTED] group, the three powers should invite the FRG to maintain a number of observers in the [REDACTED] staff.

As a part of the larger question of overall governmental coordination the matter of coordinated political guidance and control of military operations needs to be clarified. At present, control of planning for measures in Europe is exercised by the Ambassadorial Group in Washington through national military authorities to [REDACTED]. Planning for measures elsewhere is handled by the separate national military authorities. But when these plans are to be executed, timing and political objectives become key features and will require careful dovetailing with other elements in the overall political program. Swift decisions will be needed on some of these matters, and the machinery now in use for planning may not yield enough response. The MAC is not a suitable body, since its geographical limitations leave it without competence for actions beyond the North Atlantic area; nor would it be proper in the early stages of operations to involve countries which lack direct Berlin responsibilities. In fact, even for a period after control of military operations has passed from [REDACTED] to SACEUR, the problem would still be a Berlin one and ought still to be under direction of the powers with Berlin responsibilities. For example, it may occur that the prospect of negotiations over Berlin will be suggested at a time when substantial

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- 4 -

NATO forces of the Central Region have become engaged, but other NATO forces have not. These engaged forces might, in fact, include units from the quadripartite powers alone. While NATO consultation would certainly be in order, political decisions ought to be made by a much narrower group than the full NATO membership.

The organization and methods that should be used to provide continuing political guidance and control should be the subject of further study by the governments with a view to later discussion.

The creation of new Allied military forces will permit additional military measures to be planned. It will be possible, without incurring additional risks, to raise substantially the level of non-nuclear force which is applied, and to broaden the range of alternative ways to use it. The increased flexibility resulting should at the same time improve nuclear credibility and also raise the threshold of nuclear choice. The lines along which new planning should proceed are set out in the attached draft directive to military authorities. This new planning must be pushed forward at much faster rates now that the Berlin crisis may quickly come to a head, and firm commitments to execute these plans must be made on the part of all governments concerned.

In addition to planning, action is called for on the part of all governments. This must aim at the prompt creation of the new military capabilities described in the paper submitted by the US to other governments on 21 July.

1 Enclosure
Draft Instructions

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